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United Cable and owned production equipment. Eagan initially contacted Ras mussen to gauge the Whalers' interest in the program, for which he and Beyus had thus far made only a pilot on hot air balloons. Rasmussen figured he might use the meeting to workshop some ideas regarding his next professional move. He brought along his twenty-two-year-old son, Scott, who was still working as the Whalers' public address announcer, to help out. While chatting about Ea gan and Beyus's program—an idea both Bill and Scott thought had legs—the possibility of a subscription cable channel devoted entirely to Connecticut area sports arose. Though none of the meeting's attendees had any experience creating a cable network, they considered it a possibility worth exploring. For the interim, they settled on the name Entertainment and Sports Programming Network, or ESP Network for short. They liked the double entendre and as sumed any shifts to their idea would likely still fall within the entertaininent and sports categories.

Shortly after its first gathering, the invigorated group arranged a meeting for Connecticut-area cable operators in United Cable's conference room to drum up interest (see appendix A). They even parked a rented state-of-the-art pro duction truck near United Cable's entrance to let the visiting operators know that ESP aimed to provide top-of-the-line productions. The presentation was sparsely attended, and those who did show thought the idea of a sports channel to be foolhardy and did not believe the inexperienced speculators possessed the know-how to pull it off. Moreover, the ESP group quickly realized that its plan would be far more expensive than anticipated because the regional cable providers received their content from several multiple-system operators (MSOs) instead of a single centralized source into which ESP could easily tap. All was not completely lost, however. United Cable vice president Jim Doby recommended that the group consider satellite distribution, a relatively new model that provided networks greater geographic range than terrestrial cable.

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CHAPTER ONE

media scholar Garry Whannel suggests the 1970s set the stage for sports TV to "reach its mature form." During this era, average American households had their television sets turned on for approximately six hours a day and devoted roughly 20 percent of that time to sports programming—a figure that jumped to about 25 percent among male viewers. “Television," as a 1979 New York Times report puts it, “became America's Big Daddy of sports during the 1970s, buy ing recognition and respectability for the Olympics, bankrolling pro football, basketball and baseball, building its own games and names, rebuilding boxing, and tantalizing viewers with sophisticated space-age toys like mini-cameras and video tape machines." ESP grew in large part out of the fertile ground its broadcast predecessors cultivated.

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

1970s set the stage for sports TV verage American households had itely six hours a day and devoted gramming--a figure that jumped evision," as a 1979 New York Times

The ESP group had a license for twenty-four hours' worth of satellite dis tribution but was still unsure as to precisely how to use it. One thing had be come abundantly clear: programming that focused on Connecticut-hardly a hotbed of sport—would not attract a national audience. The entrepreneurs consequently set out to rethink their model by considering ways to augment their sports material with syndicated reruns, old movies, or anything else that might inexpensively attract a steady stream of advertisers and eyeballs. They also shifted their original plan to operate as a subscription service to an adver tiser-supported model that would capitalize on the many national companies eager to reach the adult male demographic that sports content so effectively delivered. Bill and Scott were kicking around ideas on a muggy August road trip from Connecticut to Ocean Grove, New Jersey. The humidity and brainstorm ing eventually wore on Scott, who exasperatedly attempted to bring the long

prian Megan Mullen calls cable d by the increased deregulation lentations, in particular the 1972 nsibly designed to realize cable bserves that they actually aided ral Communications Commis obert W. McChesney outlines, fin the ability of markets to use tter than any alternative course. bly a call for commercial media 1. What this means in practice e interests." In contrast to its

Meanwhile, J. B. Doherty, the K. S. Sweet associate who handled ESP's ac count, had shopped the network to six potential buyers with no luck. The seventh meeting he organized, with Getty Oil Company vice president of di versified operations Stuart Evey, initially seemed a long shot. Though Evey's division handled Getty's nonoil interests, it mostly focused on luxury real estate and had never before ventured into cable TV or any part of the communica tions industry. The Los Angeles-based Evey, however, was a devoted sports fan who always wanted to be part of the comparatively glamorous entertainment

business. After consulting with attorney Ed Hookstratten, who represented several prominent sportscasters, Evey became convinced that ESP had the potential to serve as a “major lift" network that would enhance cable subscrip tions and provide operators greater potential to sell their more lucrative pay channels like HBO and Showtime." Evey was further motivated by the interest Anheuser-Busch expressed in ESP. The brewing company, a staple in sports media, rightly speculated that although ESP might not immediately attract large total audience numbers, the viewers who did tune in would likely fall within its target market of adult men. Given the combination of Evey's successful track record and Anheuser-Busch's interest, Getty's board green-lighted the effort,18 Getty's initial $10 million investment gave it 85 percent ownership of ESP and prevented the original ownership group from selling its stock without its new parent's permission. Though the terms of the agreement were stacked heavily in Getty's favor, ESP had no other options. K. S. Sweet, both Evey and Bill Ras mussen recount, would have likely discontinued its funding had Getty passed on ESP.19

Bill and Scott Rasmussen describe the ESP group as “jugglers" who were simultaneously maintaining the NCAA's interest by claiming its deal with Getty was almost finished, banking that Anheuser-Busch would officially agree to an advertising deal after it signed the NCAA, and hoping cable operators would give the new channel space once they realized it had secured financial back ing, a prominent content provider, and advertising. In fact, Bill Rasmussen received confirmation that Getty was officially joining the project while in a meeting with Walter Byers at the NCAA's suburban Kansas City headquarters. Getty's high-profile support made the NCAA confident enough to sign a con tract with the cable outlet on March 1, 1979. The NCAA had other reasons for · teaming with ESP. The organization had undergone scrutiny since the 1972 pas sage of Title IX, which guaranteed equal opportunities for men's and women's collegiate sports at publicly funded schools. Byers and the NCAA hoped the positive publicity ESP's programming provided their women's athletics would temper backlash against Title IX as well as criticism that the NCAA had not given women's sports adequate support since the legislation passed.

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NBC Sports. ESPN introduced Simmons as its first president on July 18, 1979. Immediately afterward, Simmons began poaching his old staff at NBC Sports, most notably operations executive Scotty Connal. This wave of industrial mi gration prompted the novice company to jokingly dub its budding Connecticut headquarters “NBC North," Ironically, RÇA—the corporation from which ESPN leased its transponder space—was NBC's parent company at the time. The communications conglomerate was indirectly helping ESPN to pilfer one of its key assets' most popular and successful divisions.

ESPN's aggressive maneuverings began to generate considerable buzz in the trade and sports press. Most of this attention focused on Bill Rasmussen. Adweek called him "one of the 12 biggest headline makers of the year," and Con necticut Magazine ran a cover story that featured a photo of Rasmussen smiling complacently with his foot resting atop a TV and the title "Why Are ABC, CBS, and NBC Afraid of This Man?"24 The attention he received bruised Evey's and Simmons's substantial egos and escalated the already sharp tensions brewing among the burgeoning network's three most powerful personalities.

ABC, CBS

to the networks as more cooperative than adversariai, “During the (1979) U.S. Open, CBS broadcast two Saturdays and two Sundays," he explained. “There were matches the first weeklike [Ilie] Năstase vs. (John] McEnroe, that weren't on. What's wrong with us carrying early round matches? I could live with that role."ó Simmons even suggested ESPN's supplementary coverage would pro vide valuable promotion for the networks' featured broadcasts, most of which aired on weekends. Though it did not initially promote itself as comparable to the networks, ESPN did work to place itself into association with them. In late 1979 the cheeky outlet bid for the rights to carry the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, ESPN management realized the company could never afford to pur chase the rights, which consistently stand among the most expensive in sports TV. However, they ponied up the $750,000 deposit required to place a bid in order to drum up publicity.47 "The networks recognize our presence," Simmons remarked. “We're like a fly buzzing around their head. They think if they can just brush it away, it will go somewhere else."28 By the time of its launch, the young company had gathered the financial support, personnel, programming contracts, and sponsors to be far more than a mere blip on the networks' radar.

Opening the Gates of Sports Heaven In a Sports Illustrated article published less than two months before ESPN's launch, Scott Rasmussen—who shared his father's charisma and media savvy provided a comment that would become the embryonic channel's mission statement. “What we're creating here is a network for sports junkies. This is not programming for soft-core sports fans who like to watch an NFL game and then switch to the news. This is a network for people who like to watch a college football game, then a wrestling match, a gymnastics meet, and a soccer game, followed by an hour-long talk show--on sports."29 ESPN's first broadcast on September 7, 1979-produced despite the network's unfinished produc tion facilities, which required staff to use portable toilets and to hop over mud holes while en route from production facilities to sets-reinforced this attitude. It opened with host Lee Leonard's voice along with stock footage of sports fans wildly cheering: “If you're a fan, if you're a fan, what you'll see in the next minutes, hours, and days that follow may convince you you've gone to sports heaven. Beyond that blue horizon," Leonard explains as the image track cuts to a shot of the sky, “is a limitless world of sport, and right now you're standing on the edge of tomorrow, with sports twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week with ESPN."" The introduction then transitions to a fast-paced montage of exciting sports moments not unlike Wide World of Sports'iconic introductory

port, personnel, programming iere blip on the networks' radar.

package and an upbeat, disco-infused song wherein a chorus of voices urges viewers to "hook us up and check us out /'cuz we're the one worth watching."

Years ago tales of Jules Verne and Buck Rogers were made of dreams and bits of wild imagination. Today modern technology has taken those dreams and that imagination and turned it into a reality that allows us to bring a television picture into your home via satellite. The pictures you're watching right now have been taken by a camera sent through some sophisticated equipment to this transmitting station, which in turn feeds a satellite. ... The satellite receives the picture, sends it to an earth station near your home, which in turn sends the picture over cable into your living room set. Total elapsed

time: one-fifth of one second, As with Leonard's discussion, crude graphics accompany Rasmussen's com ments that sketch the satellite transmission process and, in doing so, endorse a utopian vision of cable's miraculous potential to transcend time and space.

CHAPTER 1

Though the introduction manifests a clear vision for ESPN, the network's opening hours were not without hiccups. Its first event footage showcased a softball game between the Kentucky Bourbons and the Milwaukee Schlitzes a teain sponsored by one of Anheuser-Busch's main competitors. Not long afterward, it presented a live interview with University of Colorado football coach Chuck Fairbanks that ran without audio. While these glitches mortified ESPN's new production staff, Scott Rasmussen claims the network's admin istrators remained calm. “We told them not to worry," he laughed. "Nobody was watching anyhow."}

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

: vision for ESPN, the network's

launch as the backdrop for a Clockwork Orange-inspired journalistic stunt where he tested whether he could withstand watching the new channel for twenty-four hours straight.36

As ESPN struggled to find its stride, tensions flared among its leaders, all of whom felt justified in flexing their authority based on their resources (Evey), experience (Simmons), or vision (Bill and Scott Rasmussen). Evey forced Scott Rasmussen to resign just days after the network's launch by demoting him and cutting his salary by 7s percent. Bill followed in December 1980, but only after Getty gave him a sizable severance and allowed him to keep his stock.? While its behind-the-scenes leaders battled it out, ESPN was cultivating appealing and almost exclusively white and male-new personalities in front of the camera. Aside from polished and conventional anchors like Simpson, Leonard, and Grande, it hired fresh faces such as Chris Berman, Greg Gumbel, Bob Ley, and Dick Vitale, the former NCAA and National Basketball Association (NBA) coach whose raspy effusiveness (which he initially provided for only $150 a game) became a network hallmark. ESPN also opened a New York City office in early 1980 to handle its broadening portfolio of advertising accounts, which included orders from Chevrolet, Datsun, Toyota, Hertz, Gillette, Hilton, Sony, and even Tampax.

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Beyond its original made-for-TV events, ESPN suggested its programming capacity and complete devotion to sports enabled it to offer more careful and detailed coverage than its competitors. “I used to get tired of those short sports

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ABC was as interested in enhancing ESPN's already resonant brand as it was in exploiting its programming capabilities. “ESPN has done a good job in

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CHAPTER 1

building brand awareness,” remarked ABC executive Herb Granath shortly after the acquisition. “What we need to do now is tell (consumers] what it stands for." The parent company set out to help its new property develop an image that would more clearly distinguish it from competitors like USA and TBS. Brand ing emerged as a dominant and crucially important business practice along side corporations' increasingly prominent and unfettered presence in 1980s global culture. Naomi Klein claims that "successful corporations must primarily produce brands, as opposed to products," and that the “real work" for these organizations “lay not in manufacturing but marketing.” More broadly, Scott Lash and John Urry argue that contemporary culture is lived and negotiated through branded symbols that constitute what John Sherry calls a corporatized “brandscape."s+ The organizations that own and manage brands strategically sculpt their properties' cultural meanings to exploit target audiences. Consum ers, in turn, use brands to build identity and community, which often-though certainly not always-reinforce the brand's intended significance.ss

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

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dic willingness to share content -a marketable “network qual at the time. By 1985 ESPN had icial name from Entertainment confirming the acronym's trans orts TV.

This Wall Street Journal advertisement for ESPN's morning business news program, Business Times, makes no mention of sport.

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Awatershed moment in ESPN's attempts to build a respectable brand that both satisfied its target demographic and attracted a crossover audience oc curred with its coverage of the 1987 America's Cup yacht races between the United States and Australia. The United States had lost the previous America's Cup challenge to Australia for the first time since 1870. The 1987 race, which took place in the Indian Ocean off Australia's western coast, consequently took on a nationalistic tenor, with U.S. captain Dennis Conner's Stars & Stripes boat vying against the Australian team's Kookaburra III. ESPN dramatized the event by incorporating cameras on helicopters and blimps and including minicameras on the yachts that showcased crew members' frenzied maneuverings. When Conner demanded $100,000 to include a camera onboard Stars & Stripes, ESPN convinced Anheuser-Busch to foot the bill in exchange for naming the gadget the "Bud-cam."

Even though the competition took place on the other side of the world, ESPN opted to display the America's Cup's final rounds live to bill it as a must see TV event. The telecasts, which started at 11:00 p.m. EST and sometimes ran past 3:00 a.m., amazingly attracted audience numbers that rivaled, and at

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CHAPTER 1

prime-time programming. Nation v called the race "one of the great SPN's coverage "made insomniacs ct, the New York Times published up as well as a glossary of sailing ined in-a testament to the ESPN also attracted upscale advertisers Quantas, and Domain Chandon fifth president, said the event put he network] got into the psyche of ecessor, Steve Bornstein, locates it datus as other than a chickenshit n the 1987 America's Cup yielded sutlet's most profitable endeavors ized around the effort to prove, in complex production and provide

help persuade the National Foot in July 1987. “The critical acclaim isted, "did more than anything in on, not just cable TV.... I remem :r Pete] Rozelle, telling him we'd SPN four preseason games, eight The network branded its regular season's second half on Sunday da stylish, entertainment-driven tball. For instance, it initially in booth, one of whom was a rotat ion to the city where the contest ge football player Burt Reynolds le and brought in Chicago Bears one of his former team's games. iad, who later joined ESPN, criti likening watching it to "sitting in in a William Faulkner novel with production as “network quality." FL telecast received the network's 1," noted Chris Berman, "getting

CHAPTER 1

as a sort of department store. We were televising all different sports—some were important, some were curiosities—and that was getting people into our store. Ultimately, where we were going to make a lot of money and fans would be the SportsCenter franchise."67 As Bornstein indicates, SportsCenter was far less expensive to produce than live events-even the novelties.

işing all different sports--some that was getting people into our ke a lot of money and fans would n indicates, SportsCenter was far even the novelties. 3 as executive vice president and iportsCenter to enhance ESPN's st famous on-air personalities up Berman, heavily--and unapolo lysis. As Vitale bellowed in a 1984 shtick, I'm mustard, I'm hot dog." lines, an ESPN colleague claimed fas a cable TV star by assigning “Daiquiri" and Oddibe “Young players” but “doesn't care much Vitale's and Berman's marketable 2stablished expertise on specific ner, and Charley Steiner. He also orting that would allow ESPN to nd exclusive content. Moreover, Walsh retooled SportsCenter to on. Rather than giving rundowns rthy items first. For Sundays, he e meatier format of a Sunday pa ;into the SportsCenter highlights' erimenting with nonchronologi

to situate themselves at the forefront of sport's most important stories, such as Loyola Marymount University basketball player Hank Gathers's 1990 death on the court, professional basketball player Magic Johnson's 1991 announcement that he was HIV positive, heavyweight boxer Mike Tyson's 1992 rape trial and conviction, and retired football player O. J. Simpson's 1994-95 murder trial. Though ESPN had the space to give these stories more attention than main stream outlets, Walsh took measures to ensure it would be recognized as a site that skillfully uncovered and reliably illuminated sport's biggest news.

BEASURES

CHAPTER 1

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

e than the network that purchased ional—a global family of ESPN also more pervasive.

Despite SportsCenter's newfound trendiness, MTV was still the United States' most popular cable channel among younger viewers. Moreover, MTV was expanding into sports content with MTV Sports (1992-97), an anthology program loosely based on Wide World of Sports that focused on “lifestyle" sports such as skateboarding, disc golf, and windsurfing. It also began to produce spe cials like the Rock 'n' Jock basketball and softball games that brought together athletes and entertainers. John Lack, ESPN vice president of marketing who helped to create MTV and Nickelodeon earlier in his career, reasoned that in order for ESPN to compete for MTV's audience, it would need to borrow

locus of ESPN's sports-centric cy Weiden + Kennedy to create

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

ESPN2 eventually scaled back its exclusive focus on the youth demographic and extreme sports to operate as a secondary outlet for ESPN's increasing live event coverage. While ESPN continued the ESPYs and X Games and certainly did not stop courting younger viewers, it canceled gimmicky ESPN2 shows like Jock 'n' Roll, SportsNight, and the sports-memorabilia home-shopping program Power Shop in favor of more traditional programs that either recycled ESPN's commentary or showcased events it did not have the space to schedule. These

The ESPN brand's value and potential, in fact, motivated the Walt Disney Company to acquire Capital Cities Communications in 1996 for nineteen bil lion dollars, the second-largest corporate takeover ever.'s Disney chief execu tive officer (CEO) Michael Eisner called ESPN the crown jewel" in Capital Cities' portfolio and referred to it as a “magic name" with brand recognition comparable to Coca-Cola or Kodak.” Beyond collecting ESPN's substantial revenues, Disney would use the network to foster synergy and vertical inte gration. “There are synergies under every rock we turn over," Eisner crowed as Disney began negotiations to purchase Capital Cities. 87 With this acquisition came shifts like SportsCenter segments taped from Disneyland, incessant pro motions for Disney's sports-themed films, and suspicion that the Disney-owned Anaheim Mighty Ducks and Los Angeles Angels received more attention than other sports franchises. 39

A testament to ESPN's brand power, soon after Disney bought Capital Cit ies it installed ESPN president Steve Bornstein as head of ABC Sports, a move designed to enhance the properties' integration. This transition also marked the beginning of Disney's decision to phase out ABC Sports. It canceled Wide

J's penchant for humor and per overs. “The ESPN approach," he int to elevate the game.... ESPN i as the athletes they observe."84 act that sports media represen zrees—invested in building and produce them. Before it turned 960s, ABC was jokingly known casting Company.” The network's ied by an effort to build respect ited States' most popular major ich has held the rights to televise lympics' five-ring logo under its ning--sports or not--to culti on overly idealistic grounds, he t to build its brand. Indeed, this id practices. act, motivated the Walt Disney cations in 1996 for nineteen bil over ever.8s Disney chief execu 'N the "crown jewel” in Capital name" with brand recognition d collecting ESPN's substantial oster synergy and vertical inte we turn over," Eisner crowed as ul Cities.87 With this acquisition rom Disneyland, incessant pro uspicion that the Disney-owned els received more attention than

World of Sports in 1998 after thirty-seven years on the air. In 2006 it rebranded ABC Sports as "ESPN on ABC“ and moved Monday Night Football to ESPN. The cable network had eclipsed what was arguably the most storied brand in sports television history. It was more popular than ABC Sports and because of its insistence on using nonunion labor—a practice it continues—could pro duce content less expensively. In fact, journalist Michael Freeman claims that by the twentieth century's end, ESPN had established itself as Disney's most valuable asset and was effectively carrying Mickey Mouse on its shoulders. "189

CHAPTER 1

From the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network to ESPN

ie of ESPN's brand, John Walsh I were starting a sports network terrible name. Names don't mean ame stands for." ESPN has spent nd ubiquitous signifier for sports ic practices, contracts with popu events, and expansion onto dif nior vice president Vince Doria, ay Kleenex means tissues." Like evalence and, just as important, arket it played such a significant not a great name in and of itself. a disease when the network first as. But the meaning ESPN built ossible name for a sports media o affix the label to its steady flow side from a media outlet, then, ough which consumers fashion - through watching SportsCenter, le fantasy sports leagues ESPN. ;" asserts the Washington Times' America."94 79 launch, Sports Illustrated's Wil vork may someday " become the t Football and night-time World grandiose conjecture. It not only ands the sports TV franchise as SPN's presentations of Monday