Armed conflict bane of africa’s development: causes and prevention assignment

These have contributed in no measure to the underdevelopment of the continent. [7] 7. The causes of conflicts in Africa are many and they frequently reoccur. The precarious position of African states is brought into sharper focus vis-a-vis the globalisation of the rest of the world. Consequently, in the face of erupting horrors, Africa’s collective and global attentions have been diverted from the developmental needs of the continent to the management of tension, human misery and militarism. 8.

It is such concerns for peace and stability in the continent that led to the creation of the African Union (formerly known as OAU). At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 1975 to promote economic co-operation and integration in the sub-region. [8] Due to necessity, ECOWAS objective was later amended to include cooperative security. Similarly, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was originally formed to promote investment and trade within the region.

This study therefore identifies with Stedman’s definition that African conflicts are largely caused by quest of interest groups for access to power and distribution of resources. 15. Conflict can be further categorised as non-violent and violent. Non-violent conflict is expressed without the use of force and is seen by many as a natural element in human society and an essential driving force for social change. Violent conflict on the other hand poses a threat to society and, it represents one of the central causes of poverty and ‘ failed development’. The focus of this paper will be restricted to violent or armed conflict. 6. A conflict can be categorised as violent when force is used by one or more party. Violent conflict can include one-sided violence such as genocide[15] against civilians and can range from a single attack on a civilian to full-scale war. An armed conflict is defined as a situation where both parties resort to the use of armed force, in the form of manufactured weapons or sticks, stones, fire, water, etc. [16] Violent or armed conflict is categorised as interstate when waged between governments and intrastate when it occurs within a country between a government and a non-governmental party. 7. Most other definitions of armed conflict tend to focus on the number of battle related deaths. The Uppsala Peace and Conflict project defines an armed conflict as; ‘ a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’. [17] 18. Other scholars have preferred to look at the cumulative number of battle related deaths.

For example Marshall and Gurr only consider episodes of political violence that have reached minimum threshold of 1, 000 battle related deaths to be major armed conflicts. Miall also use the cumulative indicator of 1, 000 or more battle related deaths in defining major armed conflicts. However, accurately measuring battle-related deaths in chaotic conflict conditions can be problematic. Even if we assume that the statistics are accurate, judging the severity of a conflict based on the number of battle-related deaths can be problematic for a number of reasons.

The organisation noted that over the past 3 years there have been attacks on both Chadian villagers and Darfurian refugees, as part of cross boarder raids by the Sudanese ‘ Janjaweed’ militias. [19] These are not isolated cases nor is regional conflict diffusion new. For example, Miall note the phenomena of regional conflict spill-over in the great Lakes and West Africa during the immediate post-Cold War period. [20] 21. Considering regional dynamics is not only significant when analysing factors that precipitate conflict but also those that generate peace.

For example, many analysts believe recent developments in Liberia, including the democratic elections which installed Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as president could have positive repercussions for West Africa as a whole. The ICG note that ‘ just as Liberia once dragged its neighbours into a horrific war, it could now , with good policy and strong donor support , become an anchor for stability in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire’. [21] ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT 22. It is widely accepted that understanding addressing the root cause of a conflict is essential to successful and lasting resolution.

This partitioning was carried out arbitrarily without any consideration to the existing boundaries or socio-political structures. The result was that people with different cultures and traditions, from different nations, kingdoms and communities were arbitrarily joined together. 27. It was here that the stage was set for most of the conflicts that were to erupt in future (the Nigerian civil war is a good example). Most African countries gained their independence in the 1960s. The post colonial regimes inherited the boundaries, economies and laws from the colonial authorities.

They were left with the challenge of building nations out of people that share little or nothing in common. They faced this challenge by centralising political power and suppressing any form of political pluralism. However, the political monopoly eventually resulted in corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. [23] Meanwhile, agitations started brewing from the communities that were being marginalised. 28. The political, commercial, educational and social order and infrastructure established by the colonial powers in Africa were designed to satisfy their need. This need was the production and transportation of raw material to Europe.

Not minding the devastation caused by conflicts to human and material resources and the environment, there are those who benefit from it. The armed factions, international armed dealers and other foreign companies were identified to have benefited immensely from the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Adeleke argues that Charles Taylor (a rebel) derived $75m per annum from the export of resources in the area under his jurisdiction and $10m from a consortium of North American, Japanese and European miners. 27] He further claims that diamond and gold worth between $300m and $500m, $53m timber and $27m rubber were exported to Europe and South East Asia by the Liberian warlord during the Liberian civil war. [28] In Sierra Leone, the quest to plunder resources and loot central bank was also identified as the key motivation of the rebel groups that toppled the elected government of Ahmed Tijjan Kabbah of Sierra Leone in May 1997. [29] 34. The issue of ownership of land and other resources has also resulted in several conflicts in Africa.

Claims over farmland or water sources by a family or a community have resulted into severe internal conflicts in the continent. In communities where precious resources like oil, gold, diamond, etc are extracted, several complains of inadequate compensation or governments insensitivity to environmental degradation and pollution arise. This is currently the cause of conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. There is the need for African leaders to pay serious attention to environmental issues to avert the conflicts arising from the issue. 5. Similar to the above mentioned is boundary disputes (both land and maritime) among states, though the OAU decided in 1963 to accept the inherited colonial boundaries of African states. Nevertheless, there are still some cases that have been causing serious tension. Amongst them are the disputes over the Bakassi peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon, and that of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over the Islands of Mbanu, Cocotiers, Corisco, Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico. 30] Some of the disputed areas are rich in mineral resources such as oil, and hence of strategic importance to the countries in question, particularly with the present decline in the economies of the region. 36. Once hostilities breakout, there is every likelihood of outside interference both from far and near with arms traffickers also exploiting the situation. Another catalytic factor to African conflict is poverty aided by illiteracy. Collier once more argues that a country with large natural resources, many unemployed young men and little education is much at risk of conflict. 31] Even though this theory did not explained why countries with similar or worst proxies manage to avoid conflict. Undoubtedly, poverty, illiteracy and unemployment facilitates the ease with which rebel groups and warlords recruit fighters in Africa. Therefore, African leaders need to seriously look into the issues of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment as a way of preventing conflict in Africa. EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICT ON AFRICA 37. The costs of armed conflict for Africans, their cultures, societies, and economies have been immense.

One of such indicators was the French intervention in 1995 in the Comoro Islands. This followed a coup d’etat facilitated by a group of French mercenaries led by Bob Denard. The French intervened to reverse the coup and establish a transitional government with the mandate to organize elections for a democratically elected government. [35] Similary, France also intervenes in the current Cote d’ Ivoire’s crisis, by sending her troops as intervening force. 43. The action by the French military was preceded by a similar threat of intervention in Lesotho by the members of SADC.

By threatening to intervene militarily, SADC successfully prevented a coup in that country. [36] This action was taken with the approval of the member states of the sub-region and the tacit approval of the OAU. The OAU also gave an approval to the French action in the Comoros. 44. At its creation in 1964, the OAU developed tools that were meant for the effective mediation of inter-state conflicts. The OAU Charter provided for a Commission on Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration (CMRA). This legal mechanism was created to encourage member states to submit their disputes for regional arbitration.

Resources have been sub-standard, while western countries have largely refused to take part. The western nations will need to pay more attention to solving Africa’s conflicts in order to reduce the burden from the African’s. 48. Enforcement action in post-Cold War conflicts in Africa has had varying degrees of success. In Somalia, the initial objective of the UN intervention led by the US in 1992 was the support of humanitarian relief action. This was expanded after the death of American Rangers and a group of Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993.

The American efforts did not only fail, but also caused serious damage to the confidence of the Somali people in the sincerity of the multilateral force. 49. With this failure, the mission was replaced by the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), in peacekeeping role. Many of the force contributing states however lost interest in the mission and withdrew due to constant attacks on their personnel by various Somali factions. These attacks necessitated a change in mandate, authorising enforcement action in support of restoration of order to Somalia.

Under former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, the sub-regional states had called for an international enforcement action into Burundi to stop the killings there. The former government of Burundi strongly opposed international intervention. They initially endorsed the concept of an African military intervention, but powerful interest groups within Burundi were opposed to any form of external military action. [40] The sub-regional states had to impose punitive sanctions, including an embargo on the transport of all but essential humanitarian services to Burundi. 54.

The Cold War period saw a commitment of the big powers to African conflicts. The fact that there was reluctance to get involved during the post-Cold War era is indicative of the selfishness in the initial commitment. The power of their commitment was thus shifted to institutionalisation of democracy, like the French in the Comoros. The UN has basically been involved with peacekeeping. This is probably because their only attempt at enforcement action in Somalia ended in disaster. This of course, could be because the force itself was ill composed for enforcement action.

This was so especially since the organisation, unlike the UN, had no political representation in most African countries. The OAU had recognised the need to develop linkages with national institutions and individuals that could support its early-warning mechanism. The paucity of the communication linkages, however, affected its operational efficiency. Information was getting to Addis Ababa late, further hampering the ability of the Secretary-General to provide timely response to emergencies. 60.

Even at that, the sub-regional and regional organisations are close to, and understand the political and cultural environment in which the conflicts on the continent occur. Thus they have the comparative advantage in taking the lead to prevent the escalation of conflicts. This they could accomplish by informing and coordinating from inception, with the UN before the conflicts escalates beyond their resource capability. 61. In order to be effective partners with the UN in international security management, the AU and the sub-regional bodies could develop an early-warning capability.

For instance, the Special Envoys to both Liberia and Burundi were not able to establish an effective presence in those conflict zones to provide a regular assessment. During the Chadian operations in 1982, the OAU Force Commander had no means of direct communication with the OAU Secretariat. The same was true of the OAU observer mission that was deployed to Rwanda and withdrawn in 1993. The AU could thus be assisted to develop its capacity for conflict prevention in 2 broad fields. 65. First, it could maintain a data bank of resource people and eminent persons.

This would include civilian-diplomatic, military and technical support staff. They could be called upon for deployment to states in politically tense situations, with a small field office having direct communication links with the AU Secretariat. The UN and Africa’s ‘ strategic allies’ could provide the financial and technical support for such missions. The AU political missions could be similar to UN special political missions deployed to countries such as Sierra Leone and Burundi. They would form part of an early warning and intervention system. The objective is to evelop the facility to monitor events as they develop and suggest options for intervention, while providing a platform for early action. 66. Again, it could develop a concept of using the civilian police and a Pan-African team of professionals for the restoration of law and order. This would also include institution building in collapsed state systems or in countries where the social structures have been badly weakened or destabilized. 67. The UN could also play a vital role in conflict prevention in Africa, considering the universality of promoting core values of human rights and good governance.

African states could be provided with comprehensive support in the area of governance and the rule of law, particularly one of the major conflict areas which is the electoral process. In this regard, the regional bodies could tap from the experience of the UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD). UNEAD has provided assistance in more than 150 electoral processes worldwide with administrative capacity to hold credible, transparent and fair elections. [46] 71. Sustainable and long-term development includes a focus on strengthening respect for human right and addressing core issues of human rights violation.

This is in the areas of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to development. The International Criminal Court (ICC) would play a vital role in deterring flagrant violations of human rights through the enforcement of international criminal responsibility. The ICC statute lays down sets of rules that must be followed by states in respect of the rights of their citizens. Thus, the AU could urge member states that are yet to ratify the statute to do so. This would ensure caution in dealing with human rights issues by political leaders. 2. Africa also requires developmental assistance to enhance sustainable development. Developmental assistance facilitates the creation of opportunities which indigenous actors can identify, develop and use to build an equitable, peaceful and just society. Such assistance would need to focus on decreasing the key structural risk factors that fuel violent conflicts including inequity, inequality, injustice and insecurity. The AU would require the assistance of the UN agencies and other developmental aid organisations in this regard.

CSOs have a great potential for contributing to creating more legitimate processes and sustainable outcomes in conflict prevention. Some of the areas the CSOs could collaborate are discussed below. 75. Elections have been a major cause of conflict in Africa. CSOs, political parties and governments can research and assess the strengths and weaknesses of electoral processes and inform citizens thoroughly to encourage participation. The computerisation of votes as it is currently going on in Nigeria in addition to making the process as transparent as possible would contribute to efforts in preventing vote rigging.

Thereby encouraging an efficient and fair electoral process, hence preventing conflict. 76. CSOs could develop regional youth policies that would be included in national conflict prevention policies. It could focus on youth skill development as well as in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. Effective cross border networking between youth groups can facilitate sharing experiences and best practices. 77. Governments and CSOs could research and document the chieftaincy lineages in communities.

Regional conflict diffusion or ‘ overspill’ can result from the spread of weaponry, refugee flows, when ethnic groups straddle border or when non-state armed actors operate from neighbouring countries. [47] In this respect the level of stability in one country can have serious implications for its neighbours. Over the past 10 years, conflicts in, for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Angola have all had strong regional dimensions. Together they have embroiled 14 African countries in strife.

Thus, in dealing with armed conflict in Africa it is essential to combine country specific analysis with an understanding of regional conflict dynamics. As the causes and impacts of these conflicts are regional, so must be the solutions. AU and UN could always evolve regional solutions to solving African conflicts. 85. African governments have become increasingly aware of the need to react when conflicts flare up in neighbouring countries. To do this without interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbours, many turn to existing regional organisations to intervene in the collective interest (e. . , IGAD’s role in the mediation process between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the role of SADC in the current peace “ negotiations” in the DRC and the ECOWAS peacekeeping interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone). Not all regions in Africa, however, have a suitable regional organisation. Nor can it always be assumed that, when they do, these have the capacity and legitimacy to positively impact on regional peace and development. The AU and other African institutions must therefore take a broader regional view that incorporates building constituencies for regional conflict prevention ith all stakeholders including civil society, local and multinational business and parliamentarians. 86. One component of the changing African institutional context has been the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Although principally established for the purpose of regional economic integration, conflict prevention is fast becoming an issue of great concern for them. Some of the RECs, notably ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, already have conflict prevention instruments in place.

This marks a shift away from the non-intervention principle of its predecessor, OAU, and indicates growing opportunities to promote conflict prevention at a range of levels. At an institutional level, the legal mandate of the AU Peace and Security Council offers a broadened scope for concerted efforts at conflict prevention and for collective response strategies to curb governments that propagate conflict. The Peace and Security Directorate, as the implementing arm of the Council, includes both a Conflict Management Centre (CMC) and a Peace Support Operations Division.

In addition, the planned establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) would give the AU a military capacity to support crisis management or post peace agreement operations from 2010. 90. Aside from these formal structures the AU has 2 special programmes which include conflict prevention aspects. The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) is a monitoring mechanism intended to make African leaders more accountable and transparent in their actions. The CSSDCA was initiated by African civil society and later adopted by the AU.

This early warning capacity would enhance preventive action and effectively exploit the appropriate entry points of intervention. In developing its early-warning systems, the AU and the sub-regional bodies needs to acquire comprehensive and standard demographic and populati