The brady handgun violence prevention act a policy critique assignment

This intervention created a broad basis of regulation by defining characteristics that would prohibit certain people, such as fugitives, felons and convicts, from owning guns. It also mandated the licensing of gun sellers. What the CA did not accomplish, however, was the creation f a clear and proactive meaner of preventing the prohibited parties from obtaining weapons; it Just made it illegal to do so. It could be said that, in the process of identifying the relevant stakeholders involved in the creation of the Brady Act, that all of the people of the United States are involved.

After all the US Constitution, Amendment II, which applies to all citizens, quotes, “ A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ” To narrow down the stakeholders a bit, there are essentially two sides that effected the Brady Act and its creation, implementation, Ana Monticello. Gun control activists, proponents AT Managua control, Ana people affected by gun crime like the Brady essentially created and lobbied the Brady Act into Congress, and obviously desire to see it made into law and at work in the community.

Reducing the amount of firearm dealers could be understood as counter to Brandy’s objectives, after all, if licensees are being decreased, the number of regulated firearm outlets does as well. Setting Goals and Objectives Simply put, the goal of the Brady Act was to reduce violence committed with handguns, as evidenced in the title itself: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. That’s a rather heady goal, as crime data puts handguns as the choice weapon in crime by far. Data from as far back as 1976 shows crime supplemented by a handgun to be more prevalent that those with other weapons combined. DOG, 1995). Specifically, the Brady Act would accomplish its objectives by requiring licensed gun dealers to conduct presage background checks on gun purchasers- with a list of disqualifies. Phase one started on February 28th, 1994. The measure of impact had to be determined once the policy was implemented. What the legislature did not specify, however, was a expected or reasonable denial rate. Instead the denial rate varied by location depending on what Jurisdiction was in charge of completing the Docudrama scene.

I nee variation was partly Owe to ten Tact Tanat law endorsement used different standards in selecting the criteria that rendered a buyer disqualified. For example, while some checked only for felony status, other agencies may refuse the sale because of a warrant, even warrants for unpaid traffic tickets. Ever since the CA of 1968, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (TAFT) was the nation’s leading agency of firearm policy enforcement, and would be responsible or ensuring dealers comply with the Brady Act.

The TAFT Director said in 1994, “ With 285, 000 licensees and only 240 TAFT inspectors to check their premises and the records that they keep to ensure compliance, it would take approximately 10 years for us to inspect all the gun dealers. ” (33rd Congress, 1994) Designing ten Program or Policy choose an intervention approach Because of the mandatory-compliance nature of the workings of the Brady Act, a policy doubtless served as the appropriate intervention approach. In the strictest sense, the Brady Act is actually an amendment of the CA and simply creates new policies in which to enforce it.

Persons included in the workings of the Brady Act are all prospective handgun buyers, and specifically those that fall under the disqualification categories. Since the CA, handgun ownership has been illegal for anyone that has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 1 year in prison; s a fugitive of the law; is an unlawful user or addict of a controlled substance; has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to a mental institution; is an illegal alien; is a dishonorable discharged veteran of the Armed Forces; or is a person who has renounced U. S. Citizenship.

Quite the opposite, some Clef’s have even legally challenged the constitutionality of background checks for handgun purchasers under the Brady Act, to the point of filing lawsuits against the policy in federal circuit courts. Were the law enforcement agencies that produced these lawsuits performing the background checks as they contested the policy? Investigations into the implementation of the Brady Act have found that most of the time, individual law enforcement agencies did not have the resources to make a complete investigation into all the prohibited categories.

GAO, 1996) Of course, all agencies have access to criminal record databases, but information that can also disqualify potential buyers like immigration status, military discharge details, and mental history are not always immediately accessible. This oversight was no longer of consequence, however, when the final stage of the Brady Act was implemented and the information was all readily available through the NICKS. Developing An Action Plan When it came to distributing resources, the Brady Act had a few shortcomings.

For all the criticisms of the interim phase’s obvious flaws, it was after all, a temporary provision, and its replacement was crucial. The 57-month interim ended on November 30, 1998, at which point it became mandatory for the instant background check to be operational for all federal firearm licensees and applied to all handgun purchasers. Not only was this phase change important because of the shortcomings of the interim phase, but also because of a 1997 supreme court ruling.

In a 5-4 vote, the Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to require local police to conduct background checks on potential handgun buyers. Jurist Antonio Scalia pointed out that such a requirement fell firmly into the controversial category of federalism; which is, in short, when the federal government forces legislation or policy upon the states, the very attitude that caused the US Civil War. This ruling effectively disabled he interim provisions, and the background check became entirely discretionary for local law enforcement. The development of the NICKS became crucial for the Brady Act to function.

Furthermore, the Brady Act makes no requirement for the CLEO to store information regarding reasons for approvals or rejections, nor does the TAFT have the authority to require such. This leaves the investigator with a simple percentage of rejections over a total of background checks, and although surveys have shown a huge disparity across certain Jurisdictions (for example Ohio rejection rates are below 0. 6% while Harris County, Texas shows 26. %)(information by the local law enforcement agencies. GAO, 1996) it remains largely speculative whether the variation is a result of procedure, demographic, or criminal background information available. Develop a Plan for Evaluating Outcomes By 2003, at least some form of criminal record automation had reached 49 states; while all the states have stored information regarding felonies, fugitives, domestic violence and other disqualifying factors, only recently has this data become automated.

Delays can occur, however, when accessing incomplete data; especial when the disposition of a criminal charge is in question (for example, a background check could reveal a felony charge, but the subject is denied only if there’s a felony conviction). The development of information systems is crucial for the survival of Brady; after all, it was the mandatory waiting period that the NEAR fought most fiercely, and making the process as near-instantaneous as possible best suits the main objective: to keep guns from illegal ownership without violating the rights of legitimate gun owners.

Thus the direct effect on gun crime that advocates expected from denying disqualified adults in the Brady states does not reveal itself in our data. ” To put it frankly, we can compare long-term homicide rates. Unfortunately, 1991 and 1997 rates are nearly identical: 65 and 66 percent respectively. (Cook, 2000) Suicide rates under the Brady Act have held a bit more positive data. The apparent deduction is mostly a result of the waiting period-which consequently never applied to many high crime states-, and has now been replaced by the instant POCK (point of contact) background check.

Reassessment and Review Perhaps the most dooming report comes from Cook’s direct statement “ The Brady Bill seems to have been a failure”, and not because of its inability to keep guns out of the hands of those who don’t meet the program’s requirements, but because of the ironic fact that those most likely to commit violent crime obtain their weapons from so-called ‘ secondary sources’, or unregistered or illegal dealers. This unregulated secondary gun market is in Cook’s terms ‘ a gaping loophole’ in the Brady Act. Cook, 2000) In the process of review, the Brady Act should be considered successful. The U. S. Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Brady in September 1995, effectively reversing the Judgments of the district courts. It was decided that the interim background check provision is a ‘ minimal burden’ that the federal government can demand of states. In addition, of the nine Jurisdictions where Cleo had challenged Brady, seven of them were conducting background checks. Policymakers should be testified as long as the Brady Act serves to proactively enforce the Gun Control Act’s laws.